

# Polynomial Spaces: A New Framework for Composite-to-Prime-Order Transformations

Crypto 2014, 08-18-2014

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# Outline

- 1 Composite-order groups
  - Introduction
  - Freeman's Transformation
- 2 Polynomial Spaces
- 3 Efficiency Comparison
- 4 Summary

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# Composite-Order Groups

Consider a group

$$\mathbb{G}_N \cong \mathbb{G}_p \times \mathbb{G}_q$$

$$a = (a_p, a_q)$$

put message here!

put randomness there!

Useful feature of  $\mathbb{G}_N$ : projecting maps

$$\pi: \mathbb{G}_N \longrightarrow \mathbb{G}_N, \quad \pi(\mathbb{G}_q) = \{0\}$$

$$\pi(a) = \pi(a_p, a_q) = (a_p, 0)$$

recover message!

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# Bilinear Groups of Composite-Order

If  $\mathbb{G}_N$  additionally has a symmetric pairing

$$\tilde{e}: \mathbb{G}_N \times \mathbb{G}_N \longrightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$$

we have that  $\tilde{e}$  is compatible with  $\pi$ :

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \mathbb{G}_N \times \mathbb{G}_N & \xrightarrow{\tilde{e}} & \mathbb{G}_T \\ \downarrow \pi & & \downarrow \pi_T \\ \mathbb{G}_N \times \mathbb{G}_N & \xrightarrow{\tilde{e}} & \mathbb{G}_T \end{array} \quad \tilde{e}(\pi(a), \pi(b)) = \pi_T(\tilde{e}(a, b))$$

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# Security Requirement

$$\underbrace{(0, a_q)}_{\in \mathbb{G}_q = \ker(\pi)} \quad \text{or} \quad \underbrace{(1, a_q)}_{\notin \mathbb{G}_q} ?$$

## Subgroup Indistinguishability (SUB)

$$(\mathbb{G}_N, N, a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}_q) \approx_c (\mathbb{G}_N, N, a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}_N)$$

- cannot hold if order  $q$  is known
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$\implies$  slow pairing evaluation!



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# A solution (Freeman, EC'10)

Emulate composite-order groups with prime-order groups:

composite order
$N = p \cdot q$ $\mathbb{G}_N$ $\mathbb{G}_q$ $\mathbb{G}_T$ $\tilde{e}: \mathbb{G}_N \times \mathbb{G}_N \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$

Freeman's Transf.  $\rightarrow$

prime order
$G$ with $ G  = p$ $e: G \times G \rightarrow G_T$ $p^n$ $G^n$ $H \subseteq G^n$ random subgroup $G_T^m$ $\tilde{e}: G^n \times G^n \rightarrow G_T^m$

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
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
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# Some notation...


## Bracket Notation

$[a]_{\mathcal{P}} := a_{\mathcal{P}}$ , but we usually drop the subscript if the basis is  $\mathcal{P}$

$[a + b] = [a] + [b]$  ✓     $[ab]_{\mathcal{T}} = e([a], [b])$  ✓     $[ab]$  ✗     $[abc]_{\mathcal{T}}$  ✗

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## Freeman's projecting pairing $\tilde{e}$

$$\tilde{e}\left(\begin{pmatrix} [a_0] \\ [a_1] \\ [a_2] \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} [b_0] \\ [b_1] \\ [b_2] \end{pmatrix}\right) = \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} [a_0 b_0]_T, & [a_0 b_1]_T, & \overbrace{[a_0 b_2]_T}^{e([a_0], [b_2])} \\ [a_1 b_0]_T, & [a_1 b_1]_T, & [a_1 b_2]_T \\ [a_2 b_0]_T, & [a_2 b_1]_T, & [a_2 b_2]_T \end{pmatrix}}_{\hat{=}} \begin{pmatrix} a_0 & a_1 & a_2 \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \end{pmatrix}$$

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Are random subgroups  $H \subseteq G^n$  hidden?

This is implied by the Linear Assumption in  $G$ .

Such subgroup decision problems are natural:

Observation for  $n = 2$

DDH hard in  $G \Leftrightarrow$  SUB hard in  $G^2$

$([1], [a], [b], [c])$  is a DDH tuple  $\Leftrightarrow ([a], [c]) \in \langle ([1], [b]) \rangle \subseteq G^2$

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# Our Results

A framework for emulating composite-order groups that

- provides even **faster pairing computation**
- supports **various security assumptions**
- supports **multilinear** maps
- features **simultaneously projecting & canceling** maps

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# Our Idea: A Polynomial Viewpoint

Starting like Freeman with copies of prime-order group  $G$

$$G^3 = \begin{pmatrix} G \\ G \\ G \end{pmatrix}$$

... but with different interpretation of group elements

$$[\vec{a}] = \begin{pmatrix} [a_0] \\ [a_1] \\ [a_2] \end{pmatrix} \hat{=} a_0 + a_1X + a_2X^2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$$

$\implies G^3$  is  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ -vector space with basis  $\{1, X, X^2\}$ .




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# Pairing: Polynomial Multiplication

polynomials of degree  $\leq 2$   
... and polynomial multiplication as pairing  $\tilde{e} : \overbrace{G^3} \times G^3 \rightarrow \underbrace{G_T^5}_{\text{degree } \leq 4}$

$$\tilde{e}([\vec{a}], [\vec{b}]) = \begin{pmatrix} [a_0 b_0]_T \\ [a_0 b_1]_T + [a_1 b_0]_T \\ [a_0 b_2]_T + [a_1 b_1]_T + [a_2 b_0]_T \\ [a_1 b_2]_T + [a_2 b_1]_T \\ [a_2 b_2]_T \end{pmatrix}$$

computable with evaluations of  $e : G \times G \rightarrow G_T$

# Projections

polynomials of degree  $\leq 2$

polynomials of degree  $\leq 4$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} G^3 \times G^3 & \xrightarrow{\text{polyn. mult.}} & G_T^5 \\ \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ G \times G & \xrightarrow{\text{polyn. mult.}} & G_T \end{array}$$

For polynomials  $f, g \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$  and  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  we have

$$f(s) \cdot g(s) = (f \cdot g)(s)$$

$\implies$  evaluation is a projection compatible with multiplication!

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# Subgroups

The kernel of  $\mathbf{eval}_s$  is

$$\mathbb{H}^s = \{[\vec{a}] \mid a_0 + a_1s + a_2s^2 = 0\}$$

A basis for our subgroups:

$$\mathbb{H}^s = \left\langle \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} [-s] \\ [1] \\ [0] \end{pmatrix}}_{X-s}, \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} [0] \\ [-s] \\ [1] \end{pmatrix}}_{X^2-sX} \right\rangle$$

# Is $\mathbb{H}^s$ hidden?

$$[\vec{a}] \in \mathbb{H}^s \iff \vec{a} \in \text{Im}(\mathbf{A}) \text{ with } \mathbf{A} := \begin{pmatrix} -s & 0 \\ 1 & -s \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

## The 2-SCasc Assumption

$$([\mathbf{A}], [\mathbf{A}\vec{w}]) \approx_c ([\mathbf{A}], [\vec{u}])$$

where  $\vec{w} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^2$ ,  $\vec{u} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^3$  and  $\mathbf{A} := \begin{pmatrix} -s & 0 \\ 1 & -s \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$

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# Comparison with Freeman's pairing

$$\tilde{e}([\vec{a}], [\vec{b}]) =$$

Freeman's Pairing

$$\left( \begin{array}{ccc} [a_0 b_0]_T, & [a_0 b_1]_T, & [a_0 b_2]_T, \\ [a_1 b_0]_T, & [a_1 b_1]_T, & [a_1 b_2]_T, \\ [a_2 b_0]_T, & [a_2 b_1]_T, & [a_2 b_2]_T \end{array} \right)$$

Uniform Subgroup

Our Pairing

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# Efficiency improvements

## How to Multiply Polynomials

$$\tilde{e}([\vec{a}], [\vec{b}]) = \begin{pmatrix} [a_0 b_0]_{\mathcal{T}} \\ [a_0 b_1]_{\mathcal{T}} + [a_1 b_0]_{\mathcal{T}} \\ [a_0 b_2]_{\mathcal{T}} + [a_1 b_1]_{\mathcal{T}} + [a_2 b_0]_{\mathcal{T}} \\ [a_1 b_2]_{\mathcal{T}} + [a_2 b_1]_{\mathcal{T}} \\ [a_2 b_2]_{\mathcal{T}} \end{pmatrix}$$

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- Fast polynomial multiplication: 5 applications of  $e$

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# Generalizations

- Generalizes naturally to  $k$ -linear maps
- Generalizes to other matrix assumptions (e.g.  $k$ -LIN or a uniform choice of subgroup)
- Optimal size of image for any matrix assumption
- Fast polynomial multiplication is still possible  
Number of applications of  $e$  = dimension of image

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# Efficiency Comparison

Construction	Ass.	Domain	Image	Cost $\tilde{e}$
Freeman, $k = 2$	uniform	3	9	$9 e$
Seo, $k = 2$	uniform	3	6	$9 e + 3 \text{ gop}$
Our work, $k = 2$	uniform	3	6	$6 e + 12 \text{ mexp}$
<b>Our work, <math>k = 2</math></b>	2-SCasc	3	<b>5</b>	<b><math>5 e + 22 \text{ gop}</math></b>
Freeman, $k > 2$	uniform	$k+1$	$O(k^k)$	$O(k^k) e$
Our work, $k > 2$	uniform	$k+1$	$O(2^k)$	$O(2^k) e + O(2^k) \text{ mexp}$
<b>Our work <math>k &gt; 2</math></b>	$k$ -SCasc	$k+1$	$O(k^2)$	$O(k^2) e + O(k^3) \text{ mexp}$

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<b>Our work</b> , $k = 2$	2-SCasc	3	<b>5</b>	<b>5 e + 22 gop</b>
Freeman, $k > 2$	uniform	$k+1$	$O(k^k)$	$O(k^k) e$
Our work, $k > 2$	uniform	$k+1$	$O(2^k)$	$O(2^k) e + O(2^k) \text{ mexp}$
<b>Our work</b> $k > 2$	$k$ -SCasc	$k+1$	$O(k^2)$	$O(k^2) e + O(k^3) \text{ mexp}$

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 $\text{gop}$  = group operation

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- 1 Composite-order groups
  - Introduction
  - Freeman's Transformation
- 2 Polynomial Spaces
- 3 Efficiency Comparison
- 4 **Summary**

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Modification of Freeman's Framework:

- polynomial multiplication as bilinear map
- structured subgroups instead of random ones
- security from any matrix assumption

Many benefits:

- Faster composite-order GS proofs (save about half of the pairings)
- Faster composite-order cryptosystems (BGN, predicate encryption etc.)

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Thank you for your attention!



# References

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